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and taking into account, it can be integrated back into one of the models, so 
that in the future it will provide a relevant “lateral constraint” to some ex-
ercise of imagination. If we assume that imagination is typically imagistic, 
and that mental models are typically concrete and “iconic”, but that both 
allow for thought processes that range from more iconic-pictorial to more 
digital deductive ones, then we shall notice that the two media, imagina-
tional and model-sustaining one, nicely fi t together and can interact in a 
non-problematic way.
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This volume is a festschrift dedicated to Nenad Miščević, well-known Croa-
tian philosopher, for the occasion of his 65th birthday. During his years 
in philosophy, Miščević engaged almost all areas of philosophy. So, since 
thought experiments, according to some people, lie in the foundation of all 
the disciplines and subdisciplines of philosophy as an indispensable foun-
dational refl ective tool, and could be, at the same time, a philosophical 
problem of their own (well, everything, “everything”, “‘everything’” can be a 
philosophical problem), it seemed appropriate to take them as the central 
theme of this celebration volume. 
The book consists, beside Introduction by the editors, the personal ac-
count of Miščević by Bojan Borstner and Tadej Todorović, and the Miščević’s 
own account of his views on thought experiments, of 22 chapters and each 
chapter has Miščević’s reply. Contributors to the volume are (in order of ap-
pearance): Timothy Williamson “From Anti-Metaphysics to Metaphysics“, 
Howard Robinson “Intuitions and Thought Experiments”, Maja Malec and 
Olga Markič “Miščević on Intuitions and  Thought Experiments”, Nenad 
Smokrović “Curiosity and the Argumentative Process”, Peter Gärdenfors 
“Sematic Transformations”, Danilo Šuster “Lucky Math: Anti-luck Episte-
mology and Necessary Truth”, Guido Melchior “Epistemic Luck and Logical 
Necessities: Armchair Luck Revisited”, Smiljana Gartner “Did a Particular-
ist Kill the Thought Experiment?”, Marian David “Experimental Philoso-
phy, Gettier-Cases and Pragmatic Projection”, Peter Simons “Concepts 
in a World of Particulars”, Ilhan Inan “Is the Speed of Light Knowable A 
Priori?”, Andrej Ule “Mental Models in Scientifi c Work”, Ferenc Huoranszki 
“Natural Kinds and Conceptual Truth”, Majda Trobok “Grasping the Basic 
Arithmetical Concepts: the Role of Imaginative Intuitions”, Andraž Stožer 
and Janez Bregant “The Colour Dilemma: A Subjectivist Answer”, Matjaž 
Potrč “Dasain in a Vat”, Pierre Jacob “Knowing One’s Own Mind” (some 
real history instead of thought experiment: Balkan wars were fought 1912–
1913 and Miščević was not born then, so he could not be a victim of these 
wars.), Friderik Klampfer “The False Promise of Thought-Experimentation 
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in Moral and Political Philosophy”, Miomir Matulović “Miščević, Mental 
Models, and Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy”, Boran Berčić 
“Are Nations Social Constructs? Nenad on Nations”, Rudi Kotnik “Thought 
Experiments in Teaching: TE as a Suppositional Real Story”, and Boris Vez-
jak “The Ring of Gyges and the Philosophical Imagination”.
The articles are grouped under three main headings—the fi rst deals 
with general problems about thought experiments, the second deals mostly 
with the relation of the thought experiments and the (science and meta-
physical structure of the) world; the third concentrates on thought experi-
ments in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of politics, morality and so-
ciety. But subdisciplines of philosophy emerge in each of the three parts. 
Some of the articles deal more about some other particular problem which 
Miščević discusses in his numerous works, rather than exactly the thought 
experiments or intuitions.
Of course, it is not possible, in a short review, to give even an elementary 
justice to such a volume which contains many good and new ideas, arguments 
and well-supported theories; and to each chapter, so I have chosen just sev-
eral chapters for more detailed exposition (so it is a subjective choice).
Miščević, in his overview “Accounting for Thought Experiments—25 
Years Later” characterises thought experiment (13) as an “armchair“ refl ex-
ion which involves “experimental design” for a theory which is to be tested, 
the construction of a counterfactual scenario and its careful presentation, 
thinking and refl ecting carefully about the presented scenario and, fi nally, 
“the decision“ about the theory that is tested. This “decision” is intuition of 
the experimental subject (it can be the author of the thought experiment 
himself, or an interlocutor), and it is usually compared with some relevant 
similar other thought experiments. So, thought experiments are performed 
only cognitively, “in the laboratory of mind,” to use James Brown’s charac-
terisation (17). They often include visual imagination, but what is impor-
tant in the end—to confi rm or disconfi rm the theory which is tested—should 
be careful reasoning about the scenario and the theory, though intuitions 
elicited are more scenario-based than inference based (26). Miščević fur-
ther develops some details about where to place thought experiments in 
the wider theoretical picture and then develops some specifi cs of thought 
experiments—their phenomenology, the characterisations of mental models 
building and engages experimental philosophy which challenged the use of 
thought experiments. Miščević calls his proposal, which aims at characteri-
sation and explanation of the structure and role of thought experiments and 
intuitions, “Moderate Voice of Competence View” (26). Briefl y, according to 
this model, distinct group of phenomena is made by intuitions-dispositions 
and judgements; there is a psychological capacity to use imaginative and 
judgemental competencies so we get intuitional data which do not involve 
theory and contain only just a small amount of proto-theory. For Miščević, 
concepts are not the proper objects of intuitions; they are only subordinated 
in their role to the main function of intuition which is aimed toward exter-
nal objects, items and facts (26).
Howard Robinson in his article expresses scepticism about the closely 
related notions of “thought experiment” and “intuition”—about their use-
fulness in philosophy. He uses the term “revolution” to illustrate the point. 
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Many various events are called revolutions, but only one property is com-
mon to them says Robinson—they are radical changes. Beside this, each 
particular case (of revolution) is for a discussion of its own, if we would 
like to say really important and signifi cant matters about each of them. 
Precisely this is transferred to “intuitions” and “thought experiments”. Rob-
inson (51) gives this defi nition for “intuition”: “A belief is  intuitive when the 
grounds for holding it are either not dependent on the kind of reasoning, or 
publically available evidence, which are normally regarded as necessary 
for a rational belief, or go beyond what available evidential considerations 
of a more public kind would strictly justify”; and for “thought experiment” 
(53): “A thought experiment envisages a situation meant to throw light on 
a philosophical problem where, whether that situation actually obtains or 
not, is held not to be relevant to its ability to illuminate the issue.“ Nothing 
else is generally important for these two notions—each case is on its own, 
with its content and details, for relevant discussion. So, after exposing a 
certain number of examples of “intuitively plausible or implausible cases” 
and thought experiments across semantics, problem of personal identity, 
philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics, Robinson concludes that we 
should be very sceptical about discussing “intuitions” and “thought experi-
ments” as that they are themselves a philosophical problem.
Smiljana Gartner questions the applicability of thought experiments 
in ethical contexts. It is possible to conceive a thought experiment as a 
certain ethically relevant situation and then to change only slightly the 
properties of that situation, but changes in attitudes toward the thought 
experiment, adding just these slight changes, could be, and sometimes 
are, dramatic; sometimes we can go back and forth even with contrary or 
contradictory attitudes what should we do in such situations. It seems 
that the condition of stability is not often satisfi ed concerning thought 
experiments in ethics. Gartner concludes that if we use thought experi-
ments in ethics, we should be extremely careful and precise.
Peter Simons argues in his contribution, that there are no concepts and 
meanings as abstract objects. For Simons, there are only particulars and 
collections of them. Moreover, general concepts as well as singular concepts, 
fall to the same constraints if we explain them nominalistically. To have 
such nominalist explanation of the concepts, their use and understand-
ing, we have to identify the collection of particulars that revolve around 
them (the main concrete example is the concept “horse”). These are: users, 
words, other external representations, acts, activities, capacities, compli-
ants. Though interrelations between them are complex and sometimes very 
complicated, still we can fi nd them and all these are, according to Simons, 
identifi able as concrete entities.
Boris Vezjak, in his article, challenges the idea that Plato offers a 
“thought experiment” in his Republic, as is claimed by Miščević, in the story 
of the myth of Gyges, and his objections are fourfold, so there are: general 
methodological objection, motivational objection, structural objection, and 
interpretative objection. Vezjak attempts to show by these considerations 
that Plato’s telling myth does not have relevant properties to be classifi ed 
as a thought experiment as we today conceive what thought experiment is.
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This Festchrift presents many different pieces of excellent philosophical 
work for further study and discussion. So, take a real experiment—take this 
book and read whatever interests you and fi nd out Miščević’s answers to 
articles particularly mentioned here and, as well, for all the others. We can 
praise editors for their immense work done.
DAVOR PEĆNJAK
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self¸ Rijeka: Fac-
ulty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2017, 375 pp.
The collection Perspectives on the Self brings together seventeen essays 
which explore the notion of the Self. Employing both historical and con-
ceptual analyses of the Self, the authors cover a variety of topics from re-
search areas that include metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
science, philosophy of language, ethics and history of philosophy. The book, 
published by the University of Rijeka, is a result of a conference, The Self, 
which took place at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka 
(Croatia) on March 31 and April 1, 2016. As noted in the preface by the edi-
tor Boran Berčić, Full Professor at the Rijeka Department of Philosophy, 
the participants of the conference, whose essays make up the volume, are 
in different ways involved in the research project Identity at the University 
of Rijeka. Those include both Croatian and foreign philosophers along with 
the reviewers of the book, Nenad Smokrović and Dušan Dožudić.
The book is divided into six chapters. The fi rst chapter, titled “Self and 
Body”, starts with “The Central Dogma of Transhumanism” by Eric T. Ol-
son (University of Sheffi eld). Olson argues against the transhumanist claim 
that it is metaphysically possible to upload our psychological selves into 
a digital computer. He identifi es the transhumanist claim as resting on 
a metaphysical assumption that we are essentially patterns (the pattern 
view) which can be transmitted as information. He then confronts the claim 
by insisting that we are essentially material things (more specifi cally—bio-
logical organisms), not patterns, and as such cannot be “detached” from our 
biological substrate and transferred into a computer. He also considers the 
so-called constitutional view and the temporal parts view but concludes that 
they cannot serve the transhumanist’s purposes.
Miljana Milojević (University of Belgrade) in “Embodied and Extended 
Self” combines a functionalist ontology of the self with an embodied and 
extended view on the mind. She starts by accepting the psychological-con-
tinuity criterion of personal identity (Parfi t). She then casts it in a realiz-
er-functionalist ontology which, Milojević believes, allows for an embodied 
view on the mind for which she fi nds justifi cation in the works of Gallagher, 
Shapiro and others. Finally, she uses multiple realizability of the mental to 
extend the self beyond the boundaries of the organism.
Zdenka Brzović (University of Rijeka) in “The Immunological Self” sur-
veys a number of possible identity criteria for a biological organism (func-
tional integration, autonomy, genetics). After showing their fl aws, Brzović 
shifts her analysis to different versions of the immunology criterion. She 
discusses the self-nonself theory (Burnet), several versions of the systematic 
